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Nvidia's $125 Billion Vendor Financing Problem Looks a Lot Like Lucent in 2001

MarketDash Editorial Team
17 days ago
Nvidia's $125 billion financing exposure to debt-loaded AI customers like CoreWeave, OpenAI, and xAI is 2.8 times larger than the vendor financing that sank Lucent in 2001. With CoreWeave facing $1.5 billion in debt payments by October 2025 and Nvidia subsidizing GPU deals at near-zero rates while its own capital costs 9-18%, the company is absorbing hidden margin losses that could trigger a 25-35% repricing if customers can't refinance.

Nvidia (NVDA) just posted another blockbuster quarter. Revenue hit $57 billion, up 62% year-over-year, and the stock rallied hard as investors piled back into the AI trade. Everything looks fantastic on the surface.

But here's the thing those headline numbers don't tell you: a huge chunk of that growth now depends on a small group of AI customers who are drowning in debt and relying on vendor financing just to afford Nvidia's chips.

For shareholders, this shifts the conversation. Early in the AI boom, the question was simple—does demand exist? Now it's different: can heavily leveraged customers like CoreWeave (CRWV), OpenAI, and xAI keep refinancing the massive obligations that Nvidia is counting on? Because if they can't, Nvidia has a serious problem.

The stock jumped 2.85% at close to $186, then surged another 5.08% in after-hours trading.

Nvidia Is Becoming a Bank (Whether It Wants to Admit It or Not)

Think about buying a car. Most people don't walk into a dealership with $50,000 in cash. They finance it and spread payments over several years. Pretty standard stuff.

Nvidia is now doing something similar with GPUs. Except we're not talking about tens of thousands of dollars anymore. We're talking about multibillion-dollar data center builds.

Here's the issue: many of Nvidia's biggest customers simply can't pay upfront. A single top-end GPU can cost $10,000, and a full data center build can run into hundreds of millions or even billions. So to keep the orders flowing, Nvidia has started helping customers finance the hardware instead of demanding cash on delivery. The company has put roughly $110 billion into direct investments and another $15 billion-plus into GPU-backed SPV debt.

That combined exposure? About 67% of Nvidia's annual revenue.

There's a very clear historical parallel here, and it's not a comforting one. Around the dot-com bubble, Lucent Technologies leaned heavily on vendor financing. At its peak, about 24% of Lucent's revenue was tied to loans and guarantees extended to customers. When those customers couldn't pay, Lucent took massive write-downs and the stock collapsed from $80 to $2.

Nvidia's financing exposure, as a share of revenue, is now about 2.8 times larger than what helped sink Lucent. That should make you nervous.

How the SPV Structure Actually Works

Nvidia doesn't usually lend directly to CoreWeave, xAI, OpenAI, or similar customers. Instead, it works through Special Purpose Vehicles—SPVs. If you're not familiar with these structures, here's how they operate:

  1. An AI infrastructure company needs around $12.5 billion worth of GPUs but doesn't have the cash.
  2. A separate SPV is created. The SPV raises equity and takes on a large amount of debt.
  3. The SPV uses that capital to buy Nvidia hardware, then leases the GPUs to the AI company over roughly five years. Under ASC 842 accounting rules, these leases show up on the SPV balance sheet and in Nvidia's disclosures.
  4. Nvidia recognizes most or all of the lease contract value as revenue when the transaction closes—not over the full term of the lease. The company may not receive the cash for several years, but the revenue gets booked upfront.
  5. The AI company records lease payments as operating expenses. The SPV debt doesn't sit directly on the AI customer's balance sheet.

The benefit for the startup is cleaner reported leverage. The benefit for Nvidia is larger reported revenue today. The tradeoff? More credit risk and duration risk now sit with Nvidia and the SPVs financing its hardware.

There's even another layer to this. Nvidia's cost of capital ranges from roughly 9% to 18% depending on the instrument. To make these leases attractive to customers, the effective rate charged is often close to zero or meaningfully subsidized. That spread, on a financing book of about $110 billion, can produce an 8% to 18% annual margin drag that doesn't look like a traditional cost of goods sold line item. It's hidden.

The Maturity Wall Is Closer Than You Think

This isn't some distant, theoretical risk. Several large exposures are approaching key refinancing and funding milestones over the next few quarters. Let's walk through the three biggest landmines.

Event 1: CoreWeave

CoreWeave is the largest single beneficiary of Nvidia-linked financing. The company has already drawn roughly $8 billion of its $12.9 billion in committed facilities.

Here's the problem: CoreWeave faces more than $1.5 billion in debt payments by October 2025. That's not far away.

CoreWeave's Q3 2025 S-1 filing shows that interest expense reached about $311 million in the quarter—roughly triple the prior year. The credit agreements include a clause that any new debt raised must first reduce existing tranches rather than fund growth. That makes it significantly harder to both refinance and continue scaling capacity.

Covenants also require that contracted future revenues cover debt repayments. If customers delay deployments or cancel contracts, CoreWeave can quickly fall out of compliance with those covenants.

If CoreWeave can't secure an extension or new facilities by early 2026, the company will be pushed into restructuring talks. That's not a 2027 problem. That's a problem for the next several quarters.

If CoreWeave fails, Nvidia's 7% equity stake gets written down to zero. On top of that, Nvidia could face pressure to support the value of GPU collateral across related SPVs, potentially by buying back hundreds of thousands of GPUs at weaker prices. That's a direct hit to the balance sheet.

Event 2: OpenAI

OpenAI is burning cash at an estimated 57% of revenue. For every dollar of revenue, the company is spending around $1.57. Management expects 2025 losses in the range of $8 to $9 billion on about $13 billion of revenue.

According to recent disclosures, OpenAI doesn't expect to turn cash-flow positive until 2029 or 2030. That path assumes fundraising conditions remain supportive. The company projects cumulative cash burn of roughly $115 billion through 2029, which implies raising at least $120 billion from investors to bridge the gap.

Nvidia has agreed to invest up to $100 billion in OpenAI in ten pieces of $10 billion each. OpenAI receives each new piece only after it hits certain deployment milestones, and the price of each piece depends on what the company is worth at that time.

If OpenAI's next funding round comes in flat or lower than the March 2025 valuation, the economic value of later tranches falls. Down rounds dilute earlier investors and signal that the market is questioning the current growth and profitability assumptions. In that scenario, Nvidia has less incentive to deploy the full $100 billion commitment on the original terms, and may face write-downs on previously funded tranches.

Event 3: xAI

xAI is raising about $15 billion at a valuation near $230 billion, up from roughly $113 billion earlier in 2025. That's a doubling of valuation in under a year without a step-up in revenue. Let that sink in.

The company is spending heavily on the Memphis Project Colossus data center while still in an early stage of monetization.

If AI funding cools and valuations reset by 30% to 40%, the tranches Nvidia has tied to those valuations take an immediate hit. A $20 billion commitment sized off a $230 billion valuation effectively shrinks if the next round prices the company at $160 billion. That can translate into several billion dollars of mark-to-market losses for Nvidia.

What Happens If Customers Can't Pay

The risk here is a real chain reaction across the SPVs and the customers tied to them. It's not hard to sketch out how this unfolds:

  • CoreWeave fails to refinance and defaults.
  • Lenders seize GPUs that sit as collateral in SPVs.
  • Those GPUs are sold into secondary markets at discounts of 30% to 50%.
  • SPV collateral values fall and other AI infrastructure SPVs breach covenants.
  • Those SPVs default in sequence.
  • Nvidia reverses previously recognized revenue on undelivered or non-performing contracts and records write-downs on investments.

When Lucent's vendor financing book deteriorated in 2001, the company took around $3.5 billion in loan loss provisions through 2002. The stock crashed from $80 to $2 in less than 18 months. The company merged with Alcatel in 2006, five years later, and never truly recovered.

Nvidia's vendor financing exposure is about seven times larger in absolute dollars. If even a modest share of the $110 billion portfolio turns bad, Nvidia could easily face $10 to $15 billion in lost revenue and write-downs. That would likely compress the price-to-earnings multiple from the low 50s to the mid-30s or low 40s, which implies downside of roughly 25% to 35% from current levels.

What to Listen For From Management

Individual investors may not review detailed credit agreements, but they can still identify potential stress by paying close attention to the language Nvidia uses on earnings calls. Language matters.

Current language (2025 calls): "We have excellent visibility into $500B+ of Blackwell-Rubin revenue through 2026."

Warning language (what to listen for in Q1 2026 calls): "Many customers are exploring financing options." Or "Our lease portfolio performed in line with expectations." Or vague language about "contract performance" without specifics on deployment velocity.

Any shift toward finance or lease language signals management is managing expectations downward due to hidden customer stress signals. Once management uses that language, the market will immediately price in covenant violations and downgrades.

Once that language starts to appear, analysts and rating agencies will begin to model covenant risks, and the equity market will move ahead of the actual write-downs.

The Margin Trap Even Without Defaults

Besides the default risk and the timing of the maturity wall, there's a second problem that's even more dangerous: even if customers don't default, Nvidia is structurally losing money on a large slice of these deals.

Here's a simplified example:

  • Nvidia finances a $1 billion GPU deployment at 0-2% (to make deals attractive)
  • Nvidia's own cost of capital is roughly 9-18%, depending on the instrument
  • That's a 7-16% annual margin loss on every financed deal
  • On a $110 billion financing book, that implies $7.7-17.6 billion of annual margin drag, while revenue is recognized as if it were an all-cash sale

This doesn't show up cleanly in gross margin. The money loss is buried in "investments," equity stakes, and SPVs. On the surface, Nvidia looks like it's selling extremely high-margin hardware. Underneath, it's giving much of that margin back through subsidized financing.

This gets worse if interest rates stay elevated. Every 1 percentage point increase in effective financing costs widens the annual margin gap by roughly $1.1 billion.

Nvidia isn't financing these deals because it wants to. It's financing them because the alternative is worse. Without cheap vendor financing, CoreWeave, xAI, and OpenAI would:

  • Buy fewer GPUs, or delay deployments
  • Shift part of their spend to cheaper AMD hardware or custom ASICs
  • Lean more on used or secondary-market equipment

That would mean tens of billions of dollars in lost near-term revenue for Nvidia. So instead, Nvidia chooses to:

  • Finance the purchases on very generous terms
  • Book massive upfront hardware revenue that pleases Wall Street

And hope to earn back the lost economics over time via:

  • Multi-year lock-in to Nvidia hardware
  • Equity appreciation in customers like CoreWeave, OpenAI, and xAI
  • High-margin software, networking, and platform fees layered on top

Nvidia is not running a clean, high-margin equipment business here. It's pulling forward revenue, absorbing hidden financing losses, and betting that future equity upside and software lock-in will bail out today's concessions. If those bets fail, the margin trap becomes visible fast, and the stock will have to reprice to a much lower, more "normal" hardware multiple.

How to Trade This: Three Specific Watch Points

Watch #1: CoreWeave's Debt Refinancing Announcement (Due: December 2025)

CoreWeave is scheduled to announce Q3 2025 earnings results in mid-November 2025. Any commentary hinting at refinancing challenges, delayed deployments, or "covenant discussions" is a red flag. Pay close attention to management tone and any changes in guidance.

Watch #2: OpenAI Funding Round Valuation (Due: Q1 2026)

OpenAI's next Series E funding round will telegraph whether the market believes in the company's path to profitability. If OpenAI ends up taking capital at a flat or down-round valuation from March 2025 levels, it signals the market thinks AI startup burn rates are unsustainable. That's bad news for Nvidia.

Watch #3: Major AI Startup Layoffs or Pivot Announcements

When Anthropic, xAI, or OpenAI announce major cost-cutting or shift away from "at all costs" scaling, that's a signal that AI infrastructure demand is cooling and customers are hitting monetization concerns. Layoffs equal cash burn concerns, which equal covenant violations incoming.

If You Own NVDA

  • Avoid adding aggressively to positions until there's more clarity on CoreWeave's refinancing path.
  • Consider stop losses or structured hedges that limit downside if a major AI customer or SPV shows signs of distress.
  • Treat concentration risk carefully. A single vendor financing unwind could erase several quarters of earnings gains.

If You're Hedging or Bearish

  • One approach is to use 6 to 12 month put options slightly out of the money.
  • For example, puts with strikes around 10% below spot can act as insurance against a sharp repricing if CoreWeave or another large customer trips covenants.
  • A modest premium outlay, framed as a percentage of the underlying position, can create asymmetry if the stock gaps lower on financing news.

Final Thoughts

Let's be clear: Nvidia has done extremely well on product and demand. The Blackwell ramp is real, and AI workloads are still growing quickly. Nobody's disputing that.

At the same time, the company has leaned heavily on vendor financing and structured commitments to maintain that growth. The exposure is large relative to revenue and heavily concentrated in a small group of customers with aggressive burn profiles and significant leverage.

Lucent's experience two decades ago shows how quickly vendor financing can flip from a growth tool to a balance sheet problem. Nvidia's $110 billion vendor financing and investment portfolio is roughly 2.8 times larger relative to revenue than Lucent's was at its peak.

Watch CoreWeave. Watch OpenAI. Watch xAI. Those three companies are sitting on Nvidia's balance sheet like time bombs.

The moment one defaults, the others follow. And NVDA follows after that.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and should not be construed as financial advice. Always consult with a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions. Past performance does not guarantee future results.

Back to News

Nvidia's $125 Billion Vendor Financing Problem Looks a Lot Like Lucent in 2001

MarketDash Editorial Team
17 days ago
Nvidia's $125 billion financing exposure to debt-loaded AI customers like CoreWeave, OpenAI, and xAI is 2.8 times larger than the vendor financing that sank Lucent in 2001. With CoreWeave facing $1.5 billion in debt payments by October 2025 and Nvidia subsidizing GPU deals at near-zero rates while its own capital costs 9-18%, the company is absorbing hidden margin losses that could trigger a 25-35% repricing if customers can't refinance.

Nvidia (NVDA) just posted another blockbuster quarter. Revenue hit $57 billion, up 62% year-over-year, and the stock rallied hard as investors piled back into the AI trade. Everything looks fantastic on the surface.

But here's the thing those headline numbers don't tell you: a huge chunk of that growth now depends on a small group of AI customers who are drowning in debt and relying on vendor financing just to afford Nvidia's chips.

For shareholders, this shifts the conversation. Early in the AI boom, the question was simple—does demand exist? Now it's different: can heavily leveraged customers like CoreWeave (CRWV), OpenAI, and xAI keep refinancing the massive obligations that Nvidia is counting on? Because if they can't, Nvidia has a serious problem.

The stock jumped 2.85% at close to $186, then surged another 5.08% in after-hours trading.

Nvidia Is Becoming a Bank (Whether It Wants to Admit It or Not)

Think about buying a car. Most people don't walk into a dealership with $50,000 in cash. They finance it and spread payments over several years. Pretty standard stuff.

Nvidia is now doing something similar with GPUs. Except we're not talking about tens of thousands of dollars anymore. We're talking about multibillion-dollar data center builds.

Here's the issue: many of Nvidia's biggest customers simply can't pay upfront. A single top-end GPU can cost $10,000, and a full data center build can run into hundreds of millions or even billions. So to keep the orders flowing, Nvidia has started helping customers finance the hardware instead of demanding cash on delivery. The company has put roughly $110 billion into direct investments and another $15 billion-plus into GPU-backed SPV debt.

That combined exposure? About 67% of Nvidia's annual revenue.

There's a very clear historical parallel here, and it's not a comforting one. Around the dot-com bubble, Lucent Technologies leaned heavily on vendor financing. At its peak, about 24% of Lucent's revenue was tied to loans and guarantees extended to customers. When those customers couldn't pay, Lucent took massive write-downs and the stock collapsed from $80 to $2.

Nvidia's financing exposure, as a share of revenue, is now about 2.8 times larger than what helped sink Lucent. That should make you nervous.

How the SPV Structure Actually Works

Nvidia doesn't usually lend directly to CoreWeave, xAI, OpenAI, or similar customers. Instead, it works through Special Purpose Vehicles—SPVs. If you're not familiar with these structures, here's how they operate:

  1. An AI infrastructure company needs around $12.5 billion worth of GPUs but doesn't have the cash.
  2. A separate SPV is created. The SPV raises equity and takes on a large amount of debt.
  3. The SPV uses that capital to buy Nvidia hardware, then leases the GPUs to the AI company over roughly five years. Under ASC 842 accounting rules, these leases show up on the SPV balance sheet and in Nvidia's disclosures.
  4. Nvidia recognizes most or all of the lease contract value as revenue when the transaction closes—not over the full term of the lease. The company may not receive the cash for several years, but the revenue gets booked upfront.
  5. The AI company records lease payments as operating expenses. The SPV debt doesn't sit directly on the AI customer's balance sheet.

The benefit for the startup is cleaner reported leverage. The benefit for Nvidia is larger reported revenue today. The tradeoff? More credit risk and duration risk now sit with Nvidia and the SPVs financing its hardware.

There's even another layer to this. Nvidia's cost of capital ranges from roughly 9% to 18% depending on the instrument. To make these leases attractive to customers, the effective rate charged is often close to zero or meaningfully subsidized. That spread, on a financing book of about $110 billion, can produce an 8% to 18% annual margin drag that doesn't look like a traditional cost of goods sold line item. It's hidden.

The Maturity Wall Is Closer Than You Think

This isn't some distant, theoretical risk. Several large exposures are approaching key refinancing and funding milestones over the next few quarters. Let's walk through the three biggest landmines.

Event 1: CoreWeave

CoreWeave is the largest single beneficiary of Nvidia-linked financing. The company has already drawn roughly $8 billion of its $12.9 billion in committed facilities.

Here's the problem: CoreWeave faces more than $1.5 billion in debt payments by October 2025. That's not far away.

CoreWeave's Q3 2025 S-1 filing shows that interest expense reached about $311 million in the quarter—roughly triple the prior year. The credit agreements include a clause that any new debt raised must first reduce existing tranches rather than fund growth. That makes it significantly harder to both refinance and continue scaling capacity.

Covenants also require that contracted future revenues cover debt repayments. If customers delay deployments or cancel contracts, CoreWeave can quickly fall out of compliance with those covenants.

If CoreWeave can't secure an extension or new facilities by early 2026, the company will be pushed into restructuring talks. That's not a 2027 problem. That's a problem for the next several quarters.

If CoreWeave fails, Nvidia's 7% equity stake gets written down to zero. On top of that, Nvidia could face pressure to support the value of GPU collateral across related SPVs, potentially by buying back hundreds of thousands of GPUs at weaker prices. That's a direct hit to the balance sheet.

Event 2: OpenAI

OpenAI is burning cash at an estimated 57% of revenue. For every dollar of revenue, the company is spending around $1.57. Management expects 2025 losses in the range of $8 to $9 billion on about $13 billion of revenue.

According to recent disclosures, OpenAI doesn't expect to turn cash-flow positive until 2029 or 2030. That path assumes fundraising conditions remain supportive. The company projects cumulative cash burn of roughly $115 billion through 2029, which implies raising at least $120 billion from investors to bridge the gap.

Nvidia has agreed to invest up to $100 billion in OpenAI in ten pieces of $10 billion each. OpenAI receives each new piece only after it hits certain deployment milestones, and the price of each piece depends on what the company is worth at that time.

If OpenAI's next funding round comes in flat or lower than the March 2025 valuation, the economic value of later tranches falls. Down rounds dilute earlier investors and signal that the market is questioning the current growth and profitability assumptions. In that scenario, Nvidia has less incentive to deploy the full $100 billion commitment on the original terms, and may face write-downs on previously funded tranches.

Event 3: xAI

xAI is raising about $15 billion at a valuation near $230 billion, up from roughly $113 billion earlier in 2025. That's a doubling of valuation in under a year without a step-up in revenue. Let that sink in.

The company is spending heavily on the Memphis Project Colossus data center while still in an early stage of monetization.

If AI funding cools and valuations reset by 30% to 40%, the tranches Nvidia has tied to those valuations take an immediate hit. A $20 billion commitment sized off a $230 billion valuation effectively shrinks if the next round prices the company at $160 billion. That can translate into several billion dollars of mark-to-market losses for Nvidia.

What Happens If Customers Can't Pay

The risk here is a real chain reaction across the SPVs and the customers tied to them. It's not hard to sketch out how this unfolds:

  • CoreWeave fails to refinance and defaults.
  • Lenders seize GPUs that sit as collateral in SPVs.
  • Those GPUs are sold into secondary markets at discounts of 30% to 50%.
  • SPV collateral values fall and other AI infrastructure SPVs breach covenants.
  • Those SPVs default in sequence.
  • Nvidia reverses previously recognized revenue on undelivered or non-performing contracts and records write-downs on investments.

When Lucent's vendor financing book deteriorated in 2001, the company took around $3.5 billion in loan loss provisions through 2002. The stock crashed from $80 to $2 in less than 18 months. The company merged with Alcatel in 2006, five years later, and never truly recovered.

Nvidia's vendor financing exposure is about seven times larger in absolute dollars. If even a modest share of the $110 billion portfolio turns bad, Nvidia could easily face $10 to $15 billion in lost revenue and write-downs. That would likely compress the price-to-earnings multiple from the low 50s to the mid-30s or low 40s, which implies downside of roughly 25% to 35% from current levels.

What to Listen For From Management

Individual investors may not review detailed credit agreements, but they can still identify potential stress by paying close attention to the language Nvidia uses on earnings calls. Language matters.

Current language (2025 calls): "We have excellent visibility into $500B+ of Blackwell-Rubin revenue through 2026."

Warning language (what to listen for in Q1 2026 calls): "Many customers are exploring financing options." Or "Our lease portfolio performed in line with expectations." Or vague language about "contract performance" without specifics on deployment velocity.

Any shift toward finance or lease language signals management is managing expectations downward due to hidden customer stress signals. Once management uses that language, the market will immediately price in covenant violations and downgrades.

Once that language starts to appear, analysts and rating agencies will begin to model covenant risks, and the equity market will move ahead of the actual write-downs.

The Margin Trap Even Without Defaults

Besides the default risk and the timing of the maturity wall, there's a second problem that's even more dangerous: even if customers don't default, Nvidia is structurally losing money on a large slice of these deals.

Here's a simplified example:

  • Nvidia finances a $1 billion GPU deployment at 0-2% (to make deals attractive)
  • Nvidia's own cost of capital is roughly 9-18%, depending on the instrument
  • That's a 7-16% annual margin loss on every financed deal
  • On a $110 billion financing book, that implies $7.7-17.6 billion of annual margin drag, while revenue is recognized as if it were an all-cash sale

This doesn't show up cleanly in gross margin. The money loss is buried in "investments," equity stakes, and SPVs. On the surface, Nvidia looks like it's selling extremely high-margin hardware. Underneath, it's giving much of that margin back through subsidized financing.

This gets worse if interest rates stay elevated. Every 1 percentage point increase in effective financing costs widens the annual margin gap by roughly $1.1 billion.

Nvidia isn't financing these deals because it wants to. It's financing them because the alternative is worse. Without cheap vendor financing, CoreWeave, xAI, and OpenAI would:

  • Buy fewer GPUs, or delay deployments
  • Shift part of their spend to cheaper AMD hardware or custom ASICs
  • Lean more on used or secondary-market equipment

That would mean tens of billions of dollars in lost near-term revenue for Nvidia. So instead, Nvidia chooses to:

  • Finance the purchases on very generous terms
  • Book massive upfront hardware revenue that pleases Wall Street

And hope to earn back the lost economics over time via:

  • Multi-year lock-in to Nvidia hardware
  • Equity appreciation in customers like CoreWeave, OpenAI, and xAI
  • High-margin software, networking, and platform fees layered on top

Nvidia is not running a clean, high-margin equipment business here. It's pulling forward revenue, absorbing hidden financing losses, and betting that future equity upside and software lock-in will bail out today's concessions. If those bets fail, the margin trap becomes visible fast, and the stock will have to reprice to a much lower, more "normal" hardware multiple.

How to Trade This: Three Specific Watch Points

Watch #1: CoreWeave's Debt Refinancing Announcement (Due: December 2025)

CoreWeave is scheduled to announce Q3 2025 earnings results in mid-November 2025. Any commentary hinting at refinancing challenges, delayed deployments, or "covenant discussions" is a red flag. Pay close attention to management tone and any changes in guidance.

Watch #2: OpenAI Funding Round Valuation (Due: Q1 2026)

OpenAI's next Series E funding round will telegraph whether the market believes in the company's path to profitability. If OpenAI ends up taking capital at a flat or down-round valuation from March 2025 levels, it signals the market thinks AI startup burn rates are unsustainable. That's bad news for Nvidia.

Watch #3: Major AI Startup Layoffs or Pivot Announcements

When Anthropic, xAI, or OpenAI announce major cost-cutting or shift away from "at all costs" scaling, that's a signal that AI infrastructure demand is cooling and customers are hitting monetization concerns. Layoffs equal cash burn concerns, which equal covenant violations incoming.

If You Own NVDA

  • Avoid adding aggressively to positions until there's more clarity on CoreWeave's refinancing path.
  • Consider stop losses or structured hedges that limit downside if a major AI customer or SPV shows signs of distress.
  • Treat concentration risk carefully. A single vendor financing unwind could erase several quarters of earnings gains.

If You're Hedging or Bearish

  • One approach is to use 6 to 12 month put options slightly out of the money.
  • For example, puts with strikes around 10% below spot can act as insurance against a sharp repricing if CoreWeave or another large customer trips covenants.
  • A modest premium outlay, framed as a percentage of the underlying position, can create asymmetry if the stock gaps lower on financing news.

Final Thoughts

Let's be clear: Nvidia has done extremely well on product and demand. The Blackwell ramp is real, and AI workloads are still growing quickly. Nobody's disputing that.

At the same time, the company has leaned heavily on vendor financing and structured commitments to maintain that growth. The exposure is large relative to revenue and heavily concentrated in a small group of customers with aggressive burn profiles and significant leverage.

Lucent's experience two decades ago shows how quickly vendor financing can flip from a growth tool to a balance sheet problem. Nvidia's $110 billion vendor financing and investment portfolio is roughly 2.8 times larger relative to revenue than Lucent's was at its peak.

Watch CoreWeave. Watch OpenAI. Watch xAI. Those three companies are sitting on Nvidia's balance sheet like time bombs.

The moment one defaults, the others follow. And NVDA follows after that.

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and should not be construed as financial advice. Always consult with a qualified financial advisor before making investment decisions. Past performance does not guarantee future results.